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LIABILITY OF A FATHER FOR ITECESSARIES FUFI:ISHED
TO ITIS hiIITOP CHILD BY T iIRD PERSOITS.
There are three leading duties which a f'atLer owes
to his child - maintenanice, protection, and education.
These duties rest upon a principle of' natural law but
may be, ]perhaps more reasonably, referred to the imijlied
obligatiin, which parents assume in entering wedlock and
bringing children into the world.
The duty with which re are conceri.ed in this thesis
is that of ruintenr.ance. This obligation is so well se-
cured that it seldo.a requires to be enforced by hiraan
laws. As Pu±'fendorf observes, thle duty of maintenance
6s laid on the parei.ts riot only by nature herself but by
their own proper act in bringing children into the w,,orld.
Maintenance is defined by Schouler to be that sui-port
which one person gives to another for his living. At
crn on law the duty extends only to the necessary support
and in general it ceases ,-s soon as the child is of *e.
The civil law goes farther thar. the common law and will
and will not sRiffer . p ,re: t, at his death, to t-tally
disinherit his child without ex.-ressing kis reason for so
doing and his reason must be good. Thf2 English law, by
t le statutes 43 Eliz-ch 2 and 5 Geo. I ch. 8, requires the
fatiLer and -mther, grandfather and grand mother, of ,o-r
impotent persons, to maintain them at their own charges,
if sufficient ability, and if' a p-rent runs away, and
le ,ves his children, the church wardens and overseers of
the parish shall seize his rents, goods, and chattels and
dispose of them towards their relief. Nlo person is
bound to p-rovide a maintenance for his issue, unless where
the children are i;-potent -rnd unable to work, either
through infancy, disease, or accident and ther. is only
obliged to find them with necessaries, the p7enalty of
ref',ma1 being not :core than 20 shillings a month. These
statutes -nay be s ,id to be P- .. rt of the law of'
this country ;nd LPve been reenacted in the statutes of'
some of the states - some of 'hich leave out the clauise
relating to grand parents.
TI e 'metion as to whether, in the absence of stat-
ute, a father is under a leal obligation to provide for
the necessary rn;intenance of his minor children, is one
which has led to great conflict of adjudication in the
courts of the different states. Some states hold #hat t
the dtty is a legal one i1 respective of statutes and the
statutes of some states make the duty a legal one. In
such states, third parties m-ay always recover for neces-
saries furnished to an infant if the father fails t o ppo-
vide proper maintenance. So long as the father performs
his duty faithfully, no one can interfere, but as soon
as he fails in his duty, any tihird Derson may step in ardi
compel him to perfor : by furnishing the infant with neces
saries and then holding the father liable for them in an
action, and they mW do this even where the father ex-
pressly forbade them to furnish, the child with the arti-
cles. The law in these states is the seae with regard
to married women and infants. All the tradesman has to
prove is that the articles Fre necesscries and that the
father I as failed to ]rrovide them. Whether the infant
be at home or abroad, if the fpther fails to furnish him
with rroper maintenance, ,- third 1erson .may do so and
charge the father in an action.
The ter- "necessaries" is a relative one; what would
be necessaries in one case 1-iight not he ii- another.
:,ciessaries are not ':crely such thinL-s as cZre absolutely
essential to the suprort of the infant but are such things
as are suitable to his station in life aid his circu-
stances at the time. Suich things as food, clothing,
lodging, and :iedical attendance are clearly within thLe
rule. Thile the circumstances of each cse vxill limit
the meaning of tile term, necessaries, the following slig-
gestion will assist in con-struction -
(a) The things mst be necessary in t>ec i:, ticular
case for use and not for nere ornament. Jewelry, kid
gloves, etc. ;re nnt nec,-ssaries.
(b) They :_ust i'e for the sub tatial good of' the in-
fant andr not for his irF rlc;.sure. Liquor, cigars, to-
bacco, bicycles etc. :re not necess.ries.
(c) They must crncern the person a .d not the estate
of the irfant. Articles furnished to carry on a busi-
ness or trade are not necess;xries.
(d) They must. not be extpvpga.nt in quantity or qual-
ity. Things may be of - u;efu character but the reck-
lessnes with which they are sui'lier1, may take from them
the character of necessari:;.
(e) They must be i.eces -ary to his warts. He must not
have been supplied already or the one who supplied them
can not recover the --rice.
If the trdesman proves that the articleshe furnishea
to the infant were necessaries he ray recover. Such is
the law in the states *here the duty is alegal one.
Some states hold that the moral duty to y-rovide vo-
per support does not e nstitute a legal duty erlforcable
by an action. In those states the only doctrile on
which a father can be held responsible for necessaries
fnirnshed to his child is the ob ctrine of iripl1led agency.
In order to charge a father in an, action for necessaries
furnished to his infant child, the seller must prove that
the fatlLer authorized the purci.ase on credit; he must
prove some authority sither expressed or imt.lied. In
these states the law governing the liability of a faither
for necessaries f'urnished to his infant child i. ,) anala-
g-us to the law governing the liability nf a husband for
necess ries furnished to his wife, but it dfffiers mater-
iall4 in one respect, viz: a huisband may be held liable
for necessaries furnished to his v:ife itn certairn cases
even where he expressly forbade the giving of credit but
a father can never be held liable for necess-ries ftwn-
ished to his child u~riess lie expressly or i:: pliedly au-
thorized the purch ,se on credit. Such consent -ay be
implied from various circumstances suich as where the
father has authorized similar purchases or. credit on
formner occasions or hs nnt objected to thern and has paid
the bills, or vwhere the father sees the son wearing cloth
es which he knows have been purchased an credit and does
not object or return the-. etc. I:. such cases as these
the infanence ,,ill arise that the father authorized the
purchase nd he will accordirgly be held liable in an ac-
tion for the price.
A long chain of English authorities uphold this view
holding that the parents can not be held liable for ne-
cessaries furnished to his chtid "ithout his conse-it,
either express or implied, and that his consent will be
implied only where it would be in case of arly other per-
son tllan a parent.
Bainbridge vs. Pickering 2 W Black 1325 defendant
ws an infant. Plaii-tiff sues her for the price of'
certain feath(red caps and other ornamenta apparel. The
court says: "1To man shall take uwon him to dictate to a
parent what clothing the child shall wear, at what time
they shall be purchased or of whom. All this is to be
left to the discretion of the father and mother."
Baker vs. Keene 3 Eng. Comma. Law 449. This was an
action of assumpsit brought to recover the sum of seventy
two pounds for regimentalssuprclied to the son of defend-
ant. The son was a minor. The defendant had been pay-
ing his songs expenses at a military school. The son
left school and was gazetted as an ensign. He bought
the articles, the price of which is the subject of this
action from the plaintiff. The court held that it was
a question of fact for the -Ivry whether any authority
from the father could be inferred. "A father would not
be bound by the contract of the son unless either an ac-
tual authority -,rere proved or circunnstances appeared
from which such authority could be implied."
Fluck vs. Tollemache 11 Eng. Comm. Law 296. This
was an action of assurpsit for clothes supplied to the
defendant's son who was a cadet. The son was .t school
aP-ay frcmr. home and wv:s only fifteen years old. He
ordered tbe clothes without his father's knowledge. The
only thing vwhich connected the def'ei-A.nt with the tra.s-
action was a letter written by him to the plaintiff's
attorney refi's~ig to 1f,-y for the clothes. The court
held that the plainti'f could not rFcover- "An action
can only be maintained against a person for necessaries
supTplied to his son either 1,hen he his ordered them, and
contracted to pay for then, or wheu they have been at
first supplied without his knowledge and he has adopted
the contract afterwards. 1
Rolfe vs. Abbott 25 Eng. Comn Law. 400. Assumpsit
for a tailor's bill. Defendant's son went 'Titfl a friend
to plaintiff and ordered clothes he being a riior. His
friend recorimended him as ti e son of' a v- ry res:-ectable
gentleman but had no authority fro-i the defendant to do
so. It appeared that defendant sax: his son wearing the
clothes. The court says :"The question in this case is
whether these clothes were su- lied to the son of the de-
fendant by the assent of the defendant. For to charge
him it is essential that the goods should have been sup-
plied with his as5ernt or by his au thority.
The un--,imity of these d ec isions, shows that such
was the law of West-:iir.&ter Hall v-i.ich obviously makes no
rpovision for strangers to furnish children with neces-
saries except when a1itorized by the -;rents. Intermed-
dling strangers have no right to co-:ipe! a father to sup-
port his children. The later English authorities, wh@th
I shall now discuss, are even stronger tlhan those I have
just cited.
Blackburn vs. Ivackey 11 Eng. Coi1L. Law 295. Action
of assurmsit, brought by the -l3ai-;tiff, a tailor against
the defendant, for clot'lfes furniuled to' the defendant' s
son when he wis unaezr age. The defendan1t's son was a
lawyer's clerk on a small salary and was greatly in need
of clothes. The court held thiat a father is not bound
to pay for articles ordered by his son unless the f,ther
gives some authority ex-)ressei or i. _ilied.
Seaborne vs. MRaddy 38 Eng. Co;=. Law l14. Assump-
sit for the board ard, lodging of tLe defendant's illegit-
imate child. The court held tiat no one is b.und to pay
another for rnintaining his children , either legitimate
or illigetimate, except he hs entered irto some con-
tract to do so. Every man is to m;intain his own chili-
dren as he himself shall think proper, ;AA it requires a
contract to enable another person to do so and charge him
for it ir an action.
Lflortimore vs. Wright Lyv, Jour. 9 Excheq. 58. The
defendant's son who was a minorhad lodges with the plain
tiff for some time during a part of which he had paid for
his board, lodging atc. He afterwards fell ill but
continued with the plaintiff who supplied him with ne-
cessaries. The father being applied to by the plain-
tiff for money replied that he could not edvariceany.
The court held that the plaintiff should be non-suited.
In point of law a father who gives no authority and en-
ters into no contract is not li;able for goods supplied
to his son any more than an uncle, a brother or a stran-
ger would be. If a father does anry specific act from
which it nay be r,-asonably inferred that he has authoriz-
ed his son to contract & debt, ther. he may be liable in
respect to the de-t so contracted; but the mere moral
obligation upon P father to maintain his clld affords
no inference of a promise to do so. In order to bind a
father t'or a de ,t ii~curred by his son you must prove that
he hs contracted to Ie bound in the same manner that you
would -prove a contr ct o,;F.inst any other ,erson &-d it
ought not to be left to juries to make the law ii. each
particular case.
Shelton vs. 1Sgrii.c,ett 20 Eng. L. 8 Eq. 281. As-
suripsit for meet drinlY vrashii4 lodging ;..d other neces-
saries provided by the plaLntii'f f'or t:.e defendant's son.
It apipeared tihat, the defendant sent his son, a youth of
the age of twenty years to London to look out for a ship,
giving him five pounds and telling him to put at a cer-
tain hotel. In, teFd o goir.g there the son went to the
plaintiff's coffee-house and stayed t'if'teen weeks. The
father knew nothing of the cha-ge. Held that the father
is not liable. The v does not mithorize F. son to bind
a fther by his contracts. If' a father turns his son
out in the world the s-'r.'s only resource in tie absence
of anything to show a contract on t1e f'ather's Dart is to
apply to the p1 rish. These cases show conclusively what
the law is in England.
In this coun~r, there is a great variance of decis-
ions but a c reful examinti. of the c;-,ses will show
that the true law is well settled and hcs o.ly been ob-
scured by som/e careles - decisions. S,-ame learned text
writers after a sur-erfici. ea'iination of the cases
sta- that a father is liable for recess;jries furnis.e,-d
to his child even vrhere he expressly forbade the seller
to give his chill credit. If' this were the !]w it
would cause e-ndless injustice and pjarents would be ruined
by rpofligate sons, the father would he govt rned --y the
son instead of t e son by the father and the v!1,ole fabric
of domestic institutions vwr1zld be overthrow,.. If traJ es
men were allow;el t6 charge the father in an act in n for
tlie price of goods flrnished to the sn on credit agaiist
the afther's express orders, the result would be endless
litigatin. This would defeat one of the great objects
of law i.e. order. In short such a law would be disas-
trous in all respects. hent nd Blackstone state that
this is the 111r. Kent says "A f' ,ther is not bound by
the contrasts or debts of his son even for articles st it-
able and necessary unless an ,ctual authority be proved
or the circiii.mstnces be sufficient to imply one. That
is necessary for the child is left to the discretion of
the pa, reht; there :rt be a clear omission of duty as to
necessaries before , third person can iinterfere, arii fur-
nish them, antd charge the father. If' a father drives a
child from home by severe usage he is liable for rneces-
sries. "
An exaninati -n of' the cases Will sho tlat the cases
relied upon by Kent anr. Blackstone do rAot supiort their
pr-rositions. Van Valke-burg vs. Watsen is a ITew York
cise upon wrhich they both rely. This case was decided
upon other grounds, anti so is simply dictum. In this
case the son lived at home --ird was well provided for.
He went to a store and bougLt a coat on credit. The
court he1 d that, as there was no omission of duty on the
father's part, he w--s not liable. Therefore, this case
is not althnrity for the pro losition that, if there is
an omission of duty on the father's part he is liable.
The opinion of 1*lickstone and K-ent is iwth-,Lt the support
of any decided case. Lawson on Contracts 129 says
" parent is not under any legal oblig;ti-i. to pay the
debts of his child and this extends to necessary food,
clothing and shelter," and cites Kelly vs. Davis 6 Am.
Rep. 499.
This was an action of :ssum-'Lsit for goods sold ani
delivered to the defc .', t' minor son. The court held
that there is no Legal obiig;itio-i on - ;irent to laill-
tain his minor son independent of statutory enactmlent;
that a parent can not he charged for necessaries fur-
nished by a stranger to his minor child except upon a
promise to p y for the-,; and that such promise is not to
be inferred from mere moral obligati ,ns nor frorm the stat
utes providing for the reimburse-lent of towns; but the
omission of' duty from which a jury may find a promise by
implicati . ot law rmst be a legal duty capable of en-
forcement by process of Lwvi.
.ny decisions which have held the fAther liable
where tiere was no authority g.venby him, are based on
the erroneous state.7ents of Kent and Blackston-e. These
tvro writers have -Irne much to obscure the !iw on this
point. The true law is set forth in Gordon vs. Potter 17
Vt. 352a.
Td. def'enidaat's son worked omavy from homle by the
month. The plaintiff sold him some cloth for a suit of
clothes. It appeared that the f'tl-er knei; of the pur-
chase and gave t he son noney to have th~e suit rade Mp and
allowed him to wear the clothes about. The court held
that the plaintiff could not recover. This case reviews
the English cases ,1id disci ss es themi at length. It
settles the law in Vermont thiat th err; car be no recovery
from r father unless he authorized the 9urci:ase or credit
Some writ' rs attempt to distingui h this case )I. the
ground that it does not appear that the father did not
rpovide suitahly for the son, but I do not think that
the distinctin is wairanted by the facts of' the case.
Hunt vs. Tompson 3 Scaaion 180 is an Illinois case
'-rhichs imports the same doctrine. In this case the son
of the defendant while away from hme on a visit, bougiht
some clothes. The clothes wvere necessary ais the ones he
alre, dy had were we'l -rorn or out grown. The court held
that th-e plaintiff coulld not recover the price of' the
clothes from the father. "An express promise or circum-
stances from which a 7 rnmise by the father can be inferre
are indispensably necessary to bind a p-rent for ineces-
saries furnished to his 'nf'nt child on credit by a third
person. This case is sup-, orted by !Pter decisions.
French vs. Bentorn 44 7.11. 30. This case does not
decide wiat is the law in , Hampshire but gives an in-
teresting discissioz. of the question. The court says
"tirere is 7,ich conflict of authorities but tho settled
loh'trine of the English courts now seems to bh that the
"moral obligation of' the parent to supprrthis .inor child
imposes no obligation to py his debts unless he has
iven amthorit, t, incur the:: and the contract of the fa-
ther mmst be proven in jumt the same manner as if he were
a hrother sor orstranger."
TPe early ::.Y. cases hold that a clear and palrable
o-.ission nf duty by the pareat would give the child esed-
it and render the parent liable for necessaries. In the
latter cse of T'aym-.ond vs. Loyl 10 Barb. 463 the cases
.:aizntaining this doctrine are exaiiJned anr que~itionew and
the conclusion finally reached that in the absence of
statutes there is no legal obligation to maintain a minor
child. A f11ther rv be coMrrelled by statute to sumort
his ?Minor chila but in the absence of statute his !iabil-
ity for necessaries depends entirely upon whether tile
child vs acting ;s his agent or not.
,!here the father ls not expressly forbiddenthe pur-
chpse on ,'redlt he may in some catses be held liable in
the 1'ctrinre of i:pliod agency but where he has expressly
fnrbidden it, thle notice r -vents all possibility of ir-
plied althority. As the 'Iwi will not imply a pro~itse
where there is an express pvomise, so the lawi will not
it:ply a promise of any person against his own expres ;cd
declaration; because such declaration is repugwant to any
ti--ci-Ntinn of a promise. This proposition is supported
by Ithiting vs. nlllvan 7 a. 107. This s ar action
of assnpsit for keeping defendart's horse. The defend-
ant bought a horse of t> plaaltiff at'te • a corversation
in which the defendant enu;verated the qualities wanted in
a horse, and in vbioh the plaintiff lealared thet his
horse possessed these qUalities. Bei:nI. dissatisf ied
-,ith tie horace after he h,-a- b -ught him the defendant
sent hin to t4,.e plairitiff. At the ss-e t ile he soot a
letter to the plairttff stating tht 11e rturrned the
horse because he had been ehegated in th,@ bargain as t..e
hors;e did not correspond vwith the plaintiff's representa-
tinn. The plaintiff kont the horse about a yo:..r and
then brought this suit against tL7e defendant to recover
for ti:e boarding of the horse. The court held tha the
action could not be rialnt ined urn.ess npon the izpliod
assumpsit of the dcferP.nt, for it wr'r.-f claitmed by the
plaintiff that there was ary e:2rcs pro.isQ or the part
of the Aefen4ant to pay for keeping the horse; that there
could not possibly be any l.,plied assumpsit here because
"the law will not i:',ply a nro:.ise of any persnn against
.As own express reclaration; because such declaratlon is
ricignant to any ioflication 0? a promise." Ti.is case
clearly s,-ttles the law that a fw.ther is not liable for
nece1 :-aries fTur-:ished to his son on credit vihero he has
ex;r e -:;y forbiddenthe tihe purc-aar. on cr@dit for the law
wrill not LIply a prorise of him against his expressed
declaration.
The liability of a husband to third -ersons for nec-
essaries furni shed to his wife on credit is ,lifferent
from that of a f' ther for necessa: ries furnisl-ed to 11is
son. As .;chouler says "If the husbani does not -provide
f.-r t e wife's support, he ic. legally litble for neces-
sarios na-nished to her on credit by tradesmen even thoig
;'ai .st his orders."
A husband is legally bound to support his wife; if
ther efcre lie wrongfully leaves her rithout the means of
s11-.istenr-ce, she become!s an agent of recessity to su::,ly
her own v,,rts upon his credit. The rife is the rus-
barl's -igent and ,as an au.hocrity to bind hii:. for neces-
saries purchased by her but this a, ency does not arise
frori the married relation hut from express authority, es-
toppel, or necessity. '_en he gives her express author-
ity to purchase necessaries on credit of' course he is
lia le in an actir. for the price of the::, and also if he
ratified contracts made by her. 'V1here he has habitually
ratified hei contracts he can not, as regarts those per-
sons whom 1:e has induced to look to I.m for payment, re-
voke ti-e authority :ithout notice. The asb-r1i being
b&und to .. aLntian his vife in a manner suitable to his
:.eru.is, if he fail to supply her that maintenance, except
under certain circunstarices .vhich justify him i. with-
'U' arir.g it, sh1e 1ay le entitled from necessity to pledge
his credit, and the husba rd can not v4,th drrvl or r(-voke
this authority even by express notice to the party VIho
supn!ied her; this if by lis conduct the hush*nd compels
his ,ife to leave *ils house, she has the power to -Iledge
his credit for the necets7, ry :: intenance e'sew*ie.e. So,
also, it' Le abandons his n:ife, whe --ay pledge his credit
for necc-ss;ries. It is a!''s a o-nnl deferiTe for the
h'ishand if he can show tLht h.e !uried her "ith neces-
saries, but unlesF he ca.. show this, he is liable for
necessaries if the person vwho supplied her with them- can
show so2Le ex-ress authority, estoppel; or rieceslity.
A fvtlier is li:'ble for necessartes furnished to his in-
fant child by hillr- persons only w:here som1e authority
either ex-res or implied ca. be shom, and never 4<:Kinst
his ex-ross or--,rs. You mist ihoiVY that. the child is the
father's agenit in the trtnsection if you wish to hold the
father liable in an action. The circur stalf.e of the
child's ;, r ~ab-uts is of little imiortanoe. You umst
prove the agency nf the infant in all cases v;het'.er he is
at ho:ne or abr rI,. If the ir-fant is zt home it is eas-
icr to -.rove the agency than kra.v, from home.

